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Abstract
This paper presents evidence that the existence of deposit and lending
facilities combined with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement
are powerful tools to stabilize the overnight rate. We reach this conclusion
by comparing the behavior of this rate in Germany before and after the
start of the EMU. The analysis of the German experience is useful because
it allows to isolate the e¤ects on the overnight rate of these particular
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1 Introduction
The daily market for funds is the generic denomination for the market where
…nancial institutions trade overnight unsecured loans of their deposits at the
central bank. The interest rate set in this market (henceforth called, indistinctly,
the overnight rate, or the daily rate) plays a key role for the conduct of monetary
policy. This is because the operating procedures of central banks are designed
to a¤ect the supply and demand of reserves among …nancial institutions.
Which are the determinants of the overnight rate? Central banks try to
control it by using the instruments in their hands, namely, open market opera-
tions, reserve requirements and standing facilities. Control means an attempt
to keep the daily rate around an “o¢cial rate” which in some countries is a
“target rate” and in others is just the rate of the open market operations. One
consequence of this control is that daily rates closely follow the rates deter-
mined by central banks. However, since this control is not perfect, the spread
between market rates and o¢cial rates is usually di¤erent from zero. This dif-
ference gives an indication of the part of the daily rate which is driven by market
forces. Figure 1 presents an example of such a series. It shows the spread be-
tween the overnight rate and the rate of the main re…nancing operations (MRO)
in Germany for the period covering from September 2nd 1996 to January 23rd
2003. The dashed vertical lines represent the end of reserve maintenance peri-
ods. The most remarkable feature of this series is the outstanding di¤erences
in its behavior before and after January 1999. Before this date, the last days of
the reserve maintenance periods were characterized by signi…cant peaks in the
spread, which disappeared once the EMU was in place.1
This paper deals with characterizing and explaining the change in the behav-
ior of the mean process for the overnight rate in Germany. We believe that this
discussion goes beyond analyzing a particular historical episode in a particular
country. Instead, we argue that it helps us understand the role of fundamental
forces determining the time series properties of this rate in any economy. What
makes the German experience with the EMU a singular one is that it represents
the closest we can get to a controlled experiment in Macroeconomics. We show
that this experiment allows us to trace the e¤ect on the daily rate of changes in
the operating procedures of central banks.
We develop a model to reproduce our empirical …ndings. This means ex-
plaining not only the properties of the overnight rate in the pre- and post-EMU
periods but also the sudden change in its behavior. The explanation is based on
modeling the degree of substitutability of funds within the reserve maintenance
period. It is commonly said that if banks are risk neutral and there are no
market frictions, funds should be perfect substitutes among days of the same
reserve maintenance period. This would imply that banks would arbitrage away
any expected di¤erences between the current and future cost of funds. In other
words, overnight rates should follow a martingale.
1 In this paper, when we use the term EMU or monetary union, we refer to the Stage III
of EMU.
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The main contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that this conclusion
is not true even in an environment where agents are risk neutral and there are
no impediments to trade. We reach this outcome by formalizing the instrumen-
tation of monetary policy and by showing how it has di¤erent e¤ects on the
opportunity cost of funds for di¤erent days in the same reserve maintenance pe-
riod. The corollary of this result is that banks do not see funds on di¤erent days
as perfect substitutes. In addition, it allows us to rationalize the changes in the
behavior of the overnight rate by comparing the implementation of monetary
policy before and after the EMU.
It is important to notice that our theory is not in competition with other
explanations of the lack of substitutability of funds within the reserve mainte-
nance period which are based on market frictions or risk averse behavior. Our
point is that we do not need those ingredients to understand deviations from
the martingale hypothesis. In this sense, we just explore another dimension of
the problem that we think is quantitatively important but that has not at all
been explored in the literature. Additionally we will argue that, taken by itself,
it o¤ers a better explanation of the likely e¤ects that the EMU has had on the
behavior of the overnight rate.
The line of the argument is developed as follows. Section 2 characterizes
the time series properties of the spread between the daily rate and the rate of
the main re…nancing operations in Germany. We show that there is a structural
break in this series associated with the EMU. In particular, before January 1999,
we …nd a signi…cant increase in the conditional mean of the daily rate at the end
of the reserve maintenance period. This e¤ect is lost after 1999. This section
also discusses why we concentrate in the German case and provides possible
explanations for our empirical …ndings. It turns out that existing theories of the
determination of the overnight rate within the reserve maintenance period have
di¢culties in explaining this pattern. Section 3 associates these results with
the changes in the implementation of monetary policy observed in Germany
since the beginning of 1999. We develop a model of competitive, risk-neutral
banks which is able to reproduce the features we …nd in the data. In this sense,
the model generates a sequence for the overnight rate with peaks at the end of
the maintenance period. We show that this feature of the daily rate crucially
depends on the o¢cial rates of the central bank. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of daily observations covering the period from September
1, 1996 until January 23, 2003. For the period before January 1999, we use the
spread between the overnight rate determined in the German money market and
the rate of the main re…nancing operations of the Bundesbank. We have 582
observations for the …rst subsample.2 After January 1, 1999, the series studied is
2 It is after September 1996 that the Bundesbank had an explicit o¢cial rate.
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the di¤erence between the Eonia and the rate of the main re…nancing operations
of the ECB.3 The Eonia is a volume weighted average of all overnight unsecured
lending transactions initiated within the euro area by a particular panel of banks.
The contributors to Eonia are the banks with the highest volume of business
in the euro zone money markets.4 This series is indistinguishable from the
corresponding interest rate in the German money market for that period.5 We
have 1037 observations of this variable from January 1, 1999 to January 23rd,
2003. Our linked series, therefore, includes a total of 1619 observations and
describes the part of the overnight rate determined by market forces. It is
plotted in Figure 1.
Just by looking at Figure 1, we can observe one characteristic that makes
this series “special”. Days close to the end of the maintenance period, depicted
in the graph by vertical lines, usually present higher uncertainty. Most of the
“atypical” observations (in a linear sense) are associated with these days. For
example, if we construct a two standard error band around the “o¢cial rate”, we
can observe that most of the times in which this variable is out of that interval,
happen during the last days of the maintenance periods. In particular, before
January 1999, it is 28 times outside this band, 27 of which are on the last two
days of the period. After the EMU, this ratio is just 29 to 69. Additionally,
as mentioned in the introduction, the series seems to present a structural break
because the peaks associated with the end of the maintenance period before the
EMU are no longer present in the series after the EMU. In order to assess the
signi…cativity of these peaks we use the sign test. With this nonparametric test,
we check if the probability of …nishing the maintenance period above or below
the rate of the main re…nancing operation is just 0.5. In the case of Germany
before the EMU we clearly reject the null with a p-value of 0.000. After the
EMU we accept the null with a p-value of 0.32. We also test no-parametrically
the di¤erences between the spread on the last day of the maintenance period
before and after the EMU. We use the Mann-Whitney test to test the null
hypothesis that the central locations of the two distributions are the same. We
can reject the null with a p-value of 0.000. These results are a clear indication
that something is di¤erent before and after the EMU.
Another way of looking at the data is shown in Figure 2. This …gure presents
the average spread for each day of the maintenance period. The horizontal axis
represents the number of days left until the beginning of the next maintenance
period. So, the number 1 refers to the last day of the period, number 2 to
the previous day, and so on. As we can observe the main di¤erence between
the subsamples before and after the EMU is that the high, signi…cant peak that
3For the period January 1999 to January 2003 we use the Euro-area rates (EONIA). The
correlation between German rates and Euro-Area rates is 0.99. Additionally, after June 28,
2000, the series is the di¤erence between the Eonia and the minimum rate for the variable
rate tender operations.
4 In particular, these are 47 banks from EMU countries; 4 banks from non-EMU European
countries; and 6 large international banks from non-EU countries but with important euro
area operations. For more information on this rate, see the European Banking Federation’s
internet page for the Euribor at www.euribor.org.
5The correlation between German rates and euro-area rates is 0.99.
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characterizes the behavior of the overnight rate before January 1999 is no longer
present after that date.
The purpose of this paper is to give a credible explanation of what may ex-
plain this phenomena. Therefore, the econometric speci…cation that we propose
does not pretend to capture all the characteristics and variables that might ex-
plain the behavior of the overnight rate as the comprehensive models of Wurtz
[15], or Bindseil and Seitz [4], but just to test empirically with the type of
parametric models used in the literature how signi…cant the break is.6
2.2 Econometric Speci…cation
In order to test formally how signi…cant this break is, we encompass the end of
the maintenance period e¤ect and the conditional heteroskedasticity typical in
…nancial time series by proposing the following econometric speci…cation:
it = it¡1 + ¯0Xt + ht²t (1)
with
ln(ht) = ¸
0Vt +
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where it is the overnight rate, Xt collects a set of explanatory dummies that
potentially could a¤ect the mean and Vt includes the ones that a¤ect the vari-
ance.7 The functional form of the variance is derived from the speci…cation
proposed by Nelson [12] and used in Hamilton [10]. This speci…cation captures
an EGARCH type of persistence but allowing for di¤erent e¤ects of positive
and negative shocks. It also controls for the e¤ect of changing the uncondi-
tional variance from the transmission of the conditional variance in day t¡ j to
6All the papers that present a full characterization of the behavior of the overnight rate
only model the period after the EMU. These papers pretend to capture very speci…c phenomea
of the data as the e¤ect of liquidity conditions (Bindseil and Seitz [4]), the e¤ect of meetings
(Gaspar et al. [9]), the intraday patterns of rates (Hartmann et al. [11]) or everything at the
same time as in Wurtz [15]. These speci…c facts are away of our main focus of interest, which
is just to show that there exist statistical di¤erences in the unconditional behavior of rates
before and after the EMU. Additionally, a full model of the behavior of rates would need a
huge set of information not available for the period before the EMU.
7 In the econometric speci…cation we use the overnight rate instead of the spread. This
is because we construct a model in …rst di¤erences and, therefore, the level of the rate is
not an issue. The use of the spread would generate an unnecessary noise in the estimation
since markets participants usually discount changes in the o¢cial rates at the beginning of
the reserve maintenance period while they usually occur within the period (Gaspar et al. [9]).
All the noise associated with expected changes in the target rate are captured with beggining
of maintenance period dummies.
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day t [represented by the term ln (ht¡j)¡ ¸0Vt¡j ]. For the distribution of the
error term, we use the mixture of normals proposed in Hamilton [10], because
the fat tails and the excess of kurtosis made inappropriate the use of the normal
distribution. Therefore, the density function of ²t is:
f (²t) = p
¡
2¼¾21
¢¡1=2
exp
µ¡²2t
2¾21
¶
+ (1¡ p) ¡2¼¾22¢¡1=2 expµ¡²2t2¾22
¶
: (3)
As in Hamilton [10], we use the normalization, ¾21 = 1 which implies that E(²
2
t )
is E
¡
²2t
¢
= p¾21 + (1¡ p)¾22 instead of being equal to one.
There is no consensus in the literature on how many days should be relevant
to capture the end of the maintenance period e¤ect. For example, Prati et
al. [13] …nds only the previous to last day signi…cant while Wurtz [15] tries to
explain the end of the maintenance period e¤ect by using di¤erent dummies
for di¤erent days. However, as suggested by our theoretical model, it is after
the last main re…nancing operation when the liquidity e¤ect plays a role and
when the end of the maintenance period constraint may have an impact.8 With
this fact in mind, the sets Xt and Vt are composed of the variables included in
Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1
Variables in the Mean Equation (set Xt)
Variable Meaning
X1t t occurs before January 1, 1999
X2t t occurs after January 1, 1999
X3t t occurs before January 1, 1999 and is a day after the
last MRO of the reserve maintenance period
X4t t occurs after January 1, 1999 and is a day after the
last MRO of the reserve maintenance period
X5t t occurs before January 1, 1999 and is the …rst
day of the reserve maintenance period
X6t t occurs after January 1, 1999 and is the …rst day
of the reserve maintenance period
Table 2
Variables in the Variance Equation (set Vt)
Variable Meaning
V1t t occurs before January 1, 1999
V2t t occurs after January 1, 1999
V3t X3t +X5t
V4t X4t +X6t
V5t end of the year dummy
V6t Friday e¤ect
V7t end of the month e¤ect after EMU
8Wurtz [15] and Angelini and Bisagni [1] share this view.
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This speci…cation is the most parsimonious representation that we have
found after trying di¤erent ones. Among the additional representations that
we have estimated we have tried to separate the end of the maintenance period
e¤ect dummying for each day of week as in Wurtz [15]. However,separating the
end of the maintenance period e¤ect in too many variables makes insigni…cant
most of them because of the small number of observations.9
One additional speci…cation that deserve special attention was the one that
included the end of the month e¤ect in the mean after the EMU. The purpose of
this speci…cation was to test empirically the “window dressing e¤ect” that some
authors as Wurtz [15] point out as being important in explaining the change in
behavior of the rates before and after the EMU The argument behind is that
banks demand more reserve at the end of the month for accounting reasons. If
this is true, the change of the end of the maintenance period from the end of the
month to the 23rd, could explain why the end of the maintenance period does not
present any more a signi…cant increase in demand. If this argument is right, a
signi…cant increase in demand should be seen at the end of the month. However,
we accept the null of non-signi…cativity of the end of the month coe¢cient with
a p-value of 0.20.
Finally, one more caveat requires an additional comment. The theoretical
model and the proposed econometric speci…cation suggest that, given the weekly
frequency of main re…nancing operations, maintenance periods with more days
after the last main re…nancing operation should present proportionally larger
increases in rates.10 Therefore, the subsequent decrease in rates the …rst day
of the next maintenance period should also be proportional of the number of
days past after the last main re…nancing operation. We capture that e¤ect by
allowing the dummies that capture the beginning of the maintenance period
e¤ect (X5t and X6;t) to take values from 1 to 5 as a function of the day of the
week. For example if the beginning of the maintenance period is a Thursday,
this would imply that the last day of the maintenance period was a Wednesday
and the last main re…nancing operation was in the morning of that Wednesday
leaving only one day for the end of the maintenance period e¤ect and giving
a value of 1 for the beginning of the maintenance period dummy. If it was a
Friday it would give a value of 2 and so on. This speci…cation allows us to easily
test if the changes at the end of the maintenance period are compensated away
with the corresponding increase or decrease at the beginning of the next period.
2.3 Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimation results of (1) and (2).
9 It is of particular interest the “Wednesday e¤ect” where there is no increase of rates at
the end of the maintenance period when the last MRO is in a Wednesday. This is somehow
captured in our speci…cation because we have only one day of increase rates on those main-
tenance period. However, testing this hypothesis separately for di¤erent days of the week
is inappropriate. This is because the reduction in signi…cativity due to the small number of
maintenance period that …nnish on each day of the week. This number is aproximately 6 for
each day after the EMU (18 for Fridays) and less that 4 (12 for Fridays) before the EMU.
10The “Wednesday e¤ect” is just one example of this phenomena.
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Table 3
Estimations in the Mean Equation
Parameter Estimate Std. deviation
¯1 -0.002 0.0004
¯2 -0.001 0.0003
¯3 0.072 0.021
¯4 -0.005 0.008
¯5 -0.133 0.009
¯6 0.0001 0.001
Table 4
Estimations in the Variance Equation
Parameter Estimate Std. deviation
¸1 -11.686 0.637
¸2 -12.318 0.665
¸3 5.181 0.205
¸4 4.921 0.128
¸5 2.799 0.388
¸6 0.300 0.061
¸7 3.824 0.188
±11 0.325 0.028
±21 0.015 0.005
±31 0.223 0.015
±41 0.109 0.020
±12 0.197 0.017
±13 0.043 0.025
p 0.371 0.017
¾1 1.000 -
¾2 6.005 0.192
As Table 3 shows, the behavior of the overnight rate changes after January
1999. Before the EMU, the positive and signi…cant value of ¯3 implies that
there is an increase of rates at the end of the maintenance period, of around 7
basis points per day after the last MRO. This increase is compensated with an
associated negative variation at the beginning as measured by the parameter
¯5. Remember that ¯5 represents the dummy that takes values from one to
…ve as a function of the number of days between the last MRO and the end
of the reserve maintenance period. Interestingly, the increase of the spread on
the last days of the maintenance period is very similar to the decrease at the
beginning of the next maintenance period. This means that the …rst day of the
period washes out any changes occurred around the previous settlement day.
Statistically, we can not reject the hypothesis that ¯3 = ¡¯5 (p-value of 0.08).
However, after the EMU, none of the variables that capture end or beginning
of the maintenance period e¤ect is signi…cant. The overnight rate follows closely
the martingale hypothesis and tests of the non-signi…cativity of the parameters
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¯2 and ¯4 clearly accept the null that these are 0. Additionally, contrary to
the …ndings for the US case (Hamilton [10]), there is no signi…cant e¤ect of
variables such as holidays or end-of-the week on the mean equation for both
samples. This is probably due to the longer maintenance period in Europe.
With respect to the variance equation, the results show a similar pattern
before and after the EMU, and we can accept the hypothesis that ¸1 = ¸2 and
¸3 = ¸4.
To sum up, according to the econometric results, we can conclude that some-
thing has happen to the mean of the overnight rate before and after the EMU.
The rest of the paper tries to model what can explain this change of behavior.
2.4 Discussion of our Empirical Results
In this section we explain why we concentrate in the German experience with
the EMU and discuss possible explanations for our empirical …ndings. First of
all, the EMU seems a natural experiment to analyze. At least in principle, it is
possible to identify all the institutional changes that this historical episode gen-
erated in the money markets of the Euro area. One of the main modi…cations
in these markets has to do with the conduct of monetary policy. In this respect,
most of the countries that initially entered the monetary union changed the
instruments of their central banks so much that it is di¢cult to use their experi-
ence to learn anything about the determination of the overnight rate. Germany
is the country participating in the EMU in which the operational framework
has changed the least with the EMU.11 This means that we have to justify our
empirical results by searching within a limited set of possible answers. In this
sense, Germany provides an interesting case to study and, as it will be clearer
in the next section, by doing this exercise we learn some important lessons that
should be applicable to any country.
What has been di¤erent in German money markets since January 1999? The
…rst thing that comes to our minds is the increase in the number of participants.
With the EMU, potentially any bank in the Euro area can have access to the
German market to obtain liquidity. One way this fat can explain our obser-
vations for the daily rate is by assuming that before January 1999 some bank
had market power to control rates within the reserve maintenance period selling
them cheap at the beginning and expensive at the end. This power disappeared
with the enlargement of the market. A related issue has to do with the o¢-
cial supply of reserves. It may be possible that di¤erences in the behavior of
the Bundesbank and the ECB could also explain the observed pattern of the
overnight rate. It has been recognized that the Bundesbank tended to be harder
on the market on the last day of maintenance periods. The reason was that, by
maintaining the market shorter they avoided the possibility of rates dropping
to zero on those days. This has not been the case with the ECB. However, the
main problem when using these interpretations at face value is that they do not
11 See Escrivá and Fagan [7] for a description of the operating procedures of central banks
in the Euro area before the EMU.
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provide an explanation as of why …nancial institutions did not take advantage
of this situation. If German banks knew that it was systematically harder to
get reserves at the end of the reserve maintenance periods, why did they keep
demanding reserves on those days?
This discussion brings us to the crux of the matter. One of the central
…ndings of the previous section is that we can reject the martingale hypothesis
for the overnight rate only for the …rst subsample; that is, we can reject the
hypothesis that
it = E [it+1j©t] ;
where ©t represents the information set at time t. The idea behind this hy-
pothesis is that risk-neutral banks together with an averaging provision for the
reserve requirement will make …nancial institutions arbitrage away any mis-
alignment between the current rate and its expected future value. Accepting
this proposition implies that banks should be looking at funds at di¤erent days
as perfect substitutes within the same maintenance period. Another set of ex-
planations for our …ndings, then, arises from analyzing the reasons the literature
has given to rationalize observed deviations of the daily rate from the martingale
behavior.
The two obvious candidates to justify lack of substitutability of funds are risk
aversion and impediments to trade. So it is of no surprise that the papers cover-
ing this issue assume one of them or both. For example, Hamilton [10] develops
a model in which risk aversion together with reserve accounting conventions,
transaction costs and credit line limits can reproduce the observed decrease in
the level of the Fed funds rate on Fridays in particular, and over the reserve
maintenance period in general. In Bartolini et al. [2], a liquidity preference and
transaction costs are responsible for explaining why the level of the overnight
rate as well as holdings of reserves tend to increase on settlement day. Another
possibility has been provided by Campbell [5]. He uses risk aversion, transac-
tion costs and information problems among banks about the level of aggregate
reserve demand to generate more volatility of the funds rate towards the end of
the reserve maintenance period. Spindt and Ho¤meister [14] are able to explain
this increase in volatility with a model where a market maker dealer adjusts bid
and ask rates to maximize pro…ts subject to satisfying a reserve requirement.
In such a model, reserve accounting conventions also play a central role.
Although these are valid reasons to rationalize deviations from the martin-
gale behavior, they will hardly account for the fact that these deviations were
only signi…cant before January 1999. In general, they would mean that the
EMU has had a signi…cant e¤ect on bank’s attitudes toward risk, transaction
costs or available information, conjectures which are di¢cult to sustain. Addi-
tionally, when we try to use these models, there is some feature of the data that
is left unexplained. For example, Hamilton’s model is not designed to explain
peaks at the end of the reserve maintenance period. Campbell’s analysis is local
around the full information solution and the implications for the level of the rate
depend on parameter values. Finally, Spindt and Ho¤meister’s results depend
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on the degree of market power by dealers, which, presumably, has decreased
after the uni…cation.
Still, the fact that the martingale hypothesis is rejected is an indication that
funds on di¤erent days within the same reserve maintenance period are not per-
fect substitutes. In this paper, instead of generating this lack of substitutability
by assuming risk averse agents or impediments to trade, we do so by modeling
the role of the operating procedures of central banks in the determination of the
overnight rate. In particular, we will show that these instruments of monetary
policy make the cost structure of agents demanding reserves in money markets
to be non-linear. This non-linearity makes risk neutral agents behave as if they
were risk averse and reduces the substitutability of funds across days.
We then use this results to explain the properties of the overnight rate in
Germany by analyzing the changes in the operating procedures of the ECB as
compared with the ones of the Bundesbank.12 These changes are:
² With respect to reserve requirements, both the Bundesbank and the ECB
have imposed a reserve maintenance period of one month. This period
covered a calendar month in Germany whereas after 1999 it usually starts
on the 24th of one month and ends on the 23rd of the following month.
Reserves were not remunerated in Germany. On the contrary, the ECB
remunerates required reserves at the average rate of its main re…nancing
operations.
² The conduct of open market operations has been almost identical. In
both cases they are the main source of liquidity for the system. Although
divided in several categories, main re…nancing operations have been the
most important of them in both periods. These operations were conducted
weekly, under a …xed-rate system, and had similar maturities.13
² Finally, the ECB has both a marginal as well as a deposit facility. Under
normal circumstances, access to these facility is unrestricted by commer-
cial banks. Before January 1999, the Bundesbank maintained a marginal
lending facility (called Lombard loans) that could also be used by banks
without limit. It lacked, however a deposit facility.
Could any of these di¤erences explain the observed changes in the behavior
of the daily rate in Germany? First, the remuneration of required reserves does
not seem to have had any e¤ect. The Eurosystem follows a lagged system for
requirements. This means that commercial banks know their requirements at
the beginning of the maintenance period. The remuneration is computed over
the whole amount and paid after settlement day independently of the pro…le of
accumulation of reserves. It, therefore, should act as a constant in the manage-
ment problem of banks and should not a¤ect their decisions on when to hold
12For more details about the operating procedures of the Bundesbank and the ESCB see
Deustche Bundesbank [6] and European Central Bank [8].
13 Since June 2000, the ECB has been using variable rate tenders in its main re…nancing
operations.
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reserves. Secondly, the “window dressing activities” do not seem to be signi…-
cantly important in the data, therefore, the change of the settlement day from
the end of the month to the 23rd should not have any impact on the behavior
of rates. Finally, the only possibility left is to see whether the introduction of
the deposit facility by the ECB can rationalize our empirical …ndings. This is
the topic of the next section.
3 A Theoretical Model of the Overnight Rate
3.1 Overview of the Model
We construct a model that is able to replicate the instruments of both the
Bundesbank before January 1999 as well as the ECB after that date. The
objective of this section is to explain the basic features of the model, how both
sets of instruments are nested, the mechanisms at work and the intuition of the
main results.
The economy consists of a central bank and of initially identical, risk-neutral
commercial banks (called banks for short) that exchange reserves in a compet-
itive fashion. The central bank uses several instruments to control overnight
rates. First, it imposes reserve maintenance periods of T days. During these
periods, reserve balances of commercial banks cannot be negative by the end
of each day and the accumulated balance over the maintenance period cannot
be smaller than a number R > 0. Second, the central bank provides liquidity
for the reserve maintenance period with an open market operation that takes
place at the beginning of the …rst day of the period. At the OMO, reserves are
supplied inelastically at a rate denoted io. Third, the central bank provides two
permanent facilities whose access by commercial banks is unrestricted. There
is a marginal lending facility where banks can borrow funds at the interest rate
il and a deposit facility where banks can deposit funds at the rate id.
The timing of events is as follows. All commercial banks start each main-
tenance period being identical. At the beginning of the …rst day, the central
bank o¤ers funds at an open market operation (OMO henceforth). After the
OMO, and during the …rst day, a market opens where banks can borrow and
lend reserves among themselves. At the end of the …rst day, after the market
closes, banks su¤er idiosyncratic liquidity shocks that add or drain reserves to
their accounts. Then, the central bank register the balances of the banks for
purposes of the reserve requirement. On each of the following days until the
end of the reserve maintenance period, banks meet in the market, receive the
shocks after the market is closed, and the central bank accounts for the reserve
levels. There are no more OMOs. Shocks are idiosyncratic in the sense that
they do not change the amount of funds in the system, they just reshu­e re-
serves among banks. We assume that banks do not incur in transaction costs
and that there are no credit limits on their borrowing activities. Furthermore,
there are no problems of private information in this economy. All variables are
publicly known.
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For us, T refers to the last days of the maintenance period. In particular,
we construct the model to explain the behavior of the interest rate on the days
after the last OMO of the period. This modeling choice is done for several
reasons. First, simulations of the model are very computer intensive and it is
only possible to do them for a few days. Second, the empirical part has shown
that it is the days after the last OMO of the maintenance period the ones where
the overnight rate may behave di¤erently. Finally, the last OMO is important
for operational purposes since the central bank will not be able to compensate
future liquidity shocks with further interventions before the maintenance period
is over. In our sample, T can take a value of …ve at maximum since OMOs
had a weekly frequency in Germany. Additionally, the model provides us with
a heuristic argument to interpret the behavior of the overnight rate on previous
days of the maintenance period.
This model is also design to nest the instrumentation of monetary policy in
Germany before and after the EMU. The main di¤erences can be captured by
changing the values of the o¢cial rates (il, id, and io). Both, the Bundesbank
and the ECB have had a marginal lending facility with rates il > 0. The ECB
has a deposit facility with a rate id > 0 which has been 200 basis points below
the lending rate. Furthermore, the OMO rate has been always in the middle
of the corridor de…ned by the lending and deposit rates. The Bundesbank did
not have a deposit facility which implied id = 0 for the …rst subsample. The
OMO rate was always closer to the lending rate than to zero. Below, we will
calibrate the model for the two sets of o¢cial rates. This exercise will allow us
to compare the e¤ects on the overnight rate of changing the implementation of
monetary policy.
Besides analyzing the particular di¤erences between the Bundesbank and
the ECB, some general implications of the instruments of monetary policy are
immediate. The rate of the open market operation determines the average
cost of funds over the reserve maintenance period. Therefore, it should be an
attractor of the overnight rate. Additionally, the rates of the two facilities bound
the market interest rate. No bank will borrow from the market at a rate higher
than il or lend funds at rates lower than id. Apart from these basic features the
actual path for the overnight rate in the model is determined from the demand
side. We want to show that an active monetary policy is not necessary to
reproduce what we observe in the data. In fact, the overall supply of reserves is
constant and the only unexpected changes have to do with how it is distributed
across banks. The central result in this paper is to show that even in this case,
the average interest rate may not be constant over time.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. In the determination of the
demand for reserves on any of these T days, banks look at the value of those
reserves when they are needed, that is, when the central bank accounts them for
the reserve requirement at the end of each day. First, a bank gives a high value
to reserves in instances where it has to go to the lending facility. This value
is determined by the lending rate. Second, and at the other extreme, funds
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have a low value (the deposit rate) when a bank has excess reserves.14 Third,
the market rate provides the value of funds in the other, intermediate cases.
Of course, when agents decide how much to borrow or lend, they do not know
what will happen to their reserves at the end of the day. So, in deciding their
demand for funds in the market, banks will balance the marginal costs from
borrowing (as represented by the overnight rate) with the expected marginal
value of funds as averaged over these three margins. Thus, banks will look at
how their behavior a¤ects the probabilities of reaching these three states.
What we exploit in this paper is the fact that demand changes in an asym-
metric manner the probabilities of going to the lending facility and of going
to the deposit facility. In particular, a decision that increases the probability
of having an overdraft today does not in‡uence the probability of recurring to
the lending facility in the future. On the contrary, a decision that increases
the probability of having excess reserves today increases this probability perma-
nently. In other words, once a bank accumulates all reserves required, they are
accumulated for the rest of the maintenance period. This situation is known as
banks being “locked-in”.
In this setup, how would the demand schedule for reserves behave over the
reserve maintenance period? In other words, if interest rates were constant,
would be optimal to have a constant demand for reserves? With a constant
demand for reserves the probability of using the lending facility is basically
constant over time. However, the probability of being locked-in gets larger
as time passes. Banks anticipate this e¤ect by decreasing their demand for
reserves at the beginning of the period and increasing it towards the end of the
period. This behavior puts upward pressure on the daily rate as we get closer
to settlement day.
With this model, it is also possible to conclude that changes in the instru-
ments of monetary policy may have an important in‡uence on the behavior
of the equilibrium rates. For example, the introduction of a deposit facility
should reduce the e¤ects of time on the level of the market rate. By remuner-
ating excess reserves, the facility reduces the costs of having more reserves than
what is required by the central bank. This stabilizes the demand for reserves
throughout the reserve maintenance period. We will associate di¤erent ways of
implementing monetary policy with Germany before and after the EMU. Then,
we will see that the e¤ects of changing the central bank’s instruments imply
changes on the overnight rate similar to the ones observed in the data.
3.2 The Setup
The model is based on the individual liquidity problem faced by banks when
managing their liquidity. Assume an economy inhabited by a central bank and
14Throughout the paper, the term “excess reserves” is used in a broad sense to indicate
all reserves that are not required. They include reserves deposited at the deposit facility of
the central bank. It is, therefore, a more general concept than the one used in the banking
industry which refers to idle reserves, that is, reserves that are neither required nor deposited
in the deposit facility.
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a continuum of commercial banks with measure one. The commercial banks
(called banks for short) face reserve maintenance periods of T days. On each
day t a market opens where banks can exchange reserves through loans with an
overnight maturity at an interest rate it. After the market closes, bank j 2 [0; 1]
receives a liquidity shock, "jt . If "
j
t is positive, the balance of the bank increases
and if it is negative the balance decreases. We assume these shocks are i.i.d.
across time and banks, with zero mean and drawn from a distribution F . Banks
care about the management of their liquidity because they have to ful…ll two
restrictions imposed by the monetary authority. First, current accounts cannot
be negative by the end of each day. Second, the accumulated balance over the
maintenance period cannot be smaller than a number R > 0.
Shocks represent uncertainty banks have when trading in the market about
the reserves they will have at the time the central bank accounts balances for
purposes of reserve regulations. This uncertainty is due to unexpected move-
ments in the accounts due to normal business of banks during the day, the
possibility of clerical errors and the fact that banks do not work with real time
data when exchanging reserves.
After the shocks hit the banks the monetary authority accounts the reserve
balance for purposes of the reserve regulations. If at the end of days t < T
a shock makes bank j to have a negative reserve balance, that bank will have
to borrow from the central bank’s lending facility at the rate il. After the last
day, T , if the bank does not satisfy the requirement of having an accumulated
reserve balance of R, it will have to borrow the di¤erence at the lending facility.
Borrowing reserves from the monetary authority has a cost because in equilib-
rium the o¢cial lending rate, il, is above the market rate. When a bank has
satis…ed the reserve requirement and has excess reserves, it can deposit them
at the deposit facility and obtain the rate id. The use of the deposit facility is
also costly because the deposit rate, id, is below the market rate. Given that
the liquidity shock is realized after the market closes, banks do not have perfect
control of their use of the facilities. The maturity of these deposits and loans
from the central bank is overnight.
In deciding the amounts to borrow or lend in the market at any day, banks
take into account their reserve position. This position is summarized by the
current account at the beginning of each day, ajt , and the amount of reserves a
bank j has to accumulate from day t until day T to satisfy its reserve require-
ment, also know as its de…ciency, rjt .
15 Assume that all banks start day 1 being
identical. The initial de…ciency is exogenous and determined by the reserve re-
quirement, that is, rj1 = R1 = R, all j 2 [0; 1]. The initial level of reserves, aj1,
is determined by an open market operation and will be speci…ed below. The
pair sjt = (a
j
t ; r
j
t ) de…nes the individual state of a bank on any particular day.
Let mjt and b
j
t be the amount of funds kept by a bank and the ones loaned
out in the market at day t, respectively. Given the initial level of reserves on
15 In general, lower case letters refer to individual banks while upper case letters refer to per
capita market aggregates.
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day t, ajt , these magnitudes have to satisfy
mjt + b
j
t = a
j
t , (4)
and
mjt ¸ 0:
Since the martingale result is based on noncompounding, it is assumed that
interests are paid separately so they are not capitalized. This assumption also
simpli…es the model and means that beginning-of-day reserves evolve exoge-
nously according to
ajt+1 = a
j
t + "
j
t : (5)
On the other hand, reserve de…ciencies, rjt , evolve as
rjt+1 = max
n
0; rjt ¡max
h
0;mjt + "
j
t
io
: (6)
That is, the reserve balance of the bank at the end of the day (mjt + "
j
t) is
accumulated only if it is positive and de…ciencies cannot be negative. Thus,
what matters is ful…lling the requirement of accumulating R reserves over the T
days and not how much reserves are accumulated on each particular day. Notice,
de…ciencies are nonincreasing over time. Furthermore, once the de…ciency is
zero, additional reserves are accumulated in excess. This is what is meant when
we state that a bank is “locked-in”. In other words, zero is an absorbing state
for de…ciencies.
The problem for a single bank j 2 [0; 1] is as follows. It starts day 1 with no
reserves. Thus, the …rst thing to do at the beginning of day 1 is to decide how
much reserves, aj1, to get from the OMO of the central bank. Once this decision
is taken, on every day, it has to compute how much reserves to keep and how
much to loan out or borrow in the market. The bank makes these decisions in
order to maximize the expected sum of pro…ts over all T days, so the problem
is, given the distribution of shocks, F , the sequence of market rates fi1, i2, :::,
iT g, the initial de…ciency, rj1, and the initial level of reserves, aj1, to decide on
the sequence of reserve supplies, fbj1, bj2, :::, bjTg, to maximize
E1
"
TX
t=1
¼jt
#
;
where ¼jt represents pro…ts of bank j on day t. The pro…ts of this bank at day
t are
¼jt = itb
j
t ¡ cjt ; (7)
where cjt represents the end-of-day costs derived from going to the deposit and
lending facilities of the central bank. This variable will be speci…ed below.
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The way to solve this problem is by backward induction. With this method,
we …rst solve the problem for all possible individual states and dates starting
at day T and working backwards towards the beginning of the maintenance
period. This information allows us to …nd the demand or supply of funds for
every bank on every day and to …nd the sequence of equilibrium rates. Once we
know the market clearing rates we are able to compute the pro…ts from having
reserves through the maintenance period. Notice these sequences of pro…ts and
equilibrium rates are conditioned on the initial level of reserves for each bank,
aj1, j 2 [0; 1], that were obtained at the open market operation at the beginning
of day 1. Then it is possible to see how many reserves banks are willing to obtain
from the central bank by comparing the OMO rate with the average value of
those funds throughout the maintenance period.
We will calibrate the model for the two sets of o¢cial rates that characterize
the Bundesbank before and after January 1999 and compare the implied series
for the overnight rate.
3.3 Solution of the Model
3.3.1 Problem at T
The problem of an individual bank at settlement day is to maximize with respect
to bjT
ET (¼
j
T ) = itb
j
t ¡ET (cjT )
given its initial accumulated level of reserves, ajT , its reserve de…ciency, r
j
T , and
the market’s interest rate, iT . The important point is to compute the variable
cjT . These costs are equal to
cjT = i
l(rjT ¡mjT ¡ "jT )I
h
mjT + "
j
T < r
j
T
i
¡id(mjT + "jT ¡ rjT )I
h
mjT + "
j
T > r
j
T
i
: (8)
where I[a] is an indicator function that takes value 1 when the statement in
brackets is true. The …rst term on the right hand side represents the costs of
borrowing from the monetary authority at the rate il. This happens when bal-
ances at the end of the day (mjT +"
j
T ) are not enough to satisfy the requirement
(mjT +"
j
T < r
j
T ). The second term is the revenues from using the deposit facility
at the rate id. This happens when the bank has excess reserves at the end of
the day (mjT + "
j
T > r
j
T ). Since in equilibrium the market rate is between i
d
and il, the bank will use the facilities only if it has to. Notice that the bank
will know whether it ful…lls the requirement or have excess reserves when the
shock is realized after the market is closed so the central bank is the only source
of funds or of revenues then. For the same reason, if the bank has reserves in
excess of the de…ciency, the only source of revenue is the deposit facility.
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Substituting (4) in (8) yields expected pro…ts equal to
ET
h
¼jT
i
= iT b
j
T ¡ il(rjT + bjT ¡ ajT )F (rjT + bjT ¡ ajT )
¡id(rjT + bjT ¡ ajT )
h
1¡ F (rjT + bjT ¡ ajT )
i
+il
rjT+b
j
T¡ajTZ
¡1
"f (") d"+ id
1Z
rjT+b
j
T¡ajT
"f (") d": (9)
where f is the density function of the shock. The …rst order condition for a
maximum is
iT = i
lF (rjT + b
j
T ¡ ajT ) + id
h
1¡ F (rjT + bjT ¡ ajT )
i
: (10)
This expression says that banks determine the supply of funds in order to equate
the marginal revenue of lending an additional unit of reserves with the expected
marginal cost of that unit when reserves are needed, that is, when they are com-
puted for the reserve requirement. These costs are il when the bank’s account is
overdrawn [with probability F (rjT +b
j
T ¡ajT )], and id when the bank is locked-in
[with probability 1¡F (rjT + bjT ¡ ajT )]. The supply of reserves in the interbank
market by bank j is a function of its state, summarized by the pair (ajT , r
j
T ),
the market rate, iT , and the o¢cial rates, il and id. Explicitly, it takes the form
bjT = a
j
T ¡ rjT + F¡1
µ
iT ¡ id
il ¡ id
¶
: (11)
From this expression we observe that the supply of reserves of bank j is increas-
ing with its initial level of reserves (ajT ), the rate at which the bank exchanges
reserves in the market (iT ), and it is decreasing with the reserve de…ciency (r
j
T ),
the lending rate (il) and the deposit rate (id).16
The market clearing interest rate implies that
BT =
Z 1
0
bjT dj = 0:
Integrating (11) and operating, the equilibrium rate is equal to
iT = i
lF (RT ¡AT ) + id [1¡ F (RT ¡AT )] ; (12)
where
RT =
Z 1
0
rjT dj;AT =
Z 1
0
ajTdj;
16These results and the ones below are conditioned on an interior solution. In some cases
boundary conditions may be binding and di¤erent expressions may apply. The full solution
of the model is included in the appendix.
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are the per capita aggregate de…ciency and level of reserves for day T .
De…ne the value function VT as the maximized pro…ts at day T , that is,
VT (s
j
T ;ST ) = max
bjT
ET
h
¼jT
i
; (13)
where sjt = (a
j
t , r
j
t ) represents the individual state of the bank, and St denotes
the aggregate state variable at time t represented by market rates from time t
up to time T , that is, St = fit, it+1, :::, iTg. For the last day, ST = iT . From
(9) it is easy to see that the marginal value of an additional unit of reserves is
@VT (s
j
T ;ST )
@ajT
= iT : (14)
This expression is intuitive. One more unit of reserves can be loaned out in
the market and its value should be the market rate. The marginal value of an
additional unit of de…ciency is
@VT (s
j
T ;ST )
@rjT
= ¡iT : (15)
The intuition of this result is as above. Starting the last day with an extra unit
of de…ciency means not being able to loan it in the market. The marginal cost
of this change is the market rate. Expressions (14) and (15) will be used below.
3.3.2 Problem at t · T ¡ 1
On days t · T ¡ 1 banks make decisions to maximize the sum of pro…ts until
the last day of the maintenance period given the current state and the sequence
of rates. Its decisions at time t will a¤ect pro…ts on latter days since they will
a¤ect the reserve de…ciency in the future. The problem of the bank on day
t · T ¡ 1 can then be summarized by the value function Vt(sjt ;St) de…ned as
Vt(s
j
t ; st) = max
bjt
Et
h
¼jt + Vt+1(s
j
t+1;St+1)
i
: (16)
In this expression, pro…ts are equal to
¼jt = itb
j
t + i
l(mjt + "
j
t)I
h
mjt + "
j
t < 0
i
¡id(rjt ¡mjt ¡ "jt)I
h
mjt + "
j
t > r
j
t
i
: (17)
Apart from the revenues (costs) of lending (borrowing) in the market, banks
incur in revenues and costs when borrowing from the central bank when the
end-of-day balances are negative or deposit in the deposit facility if they have
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excess reserves. As before, using (4) and taking expectations produces
Et
h
¼jt
i
= itb
j
t ¡ il(bjt ¡ ajt)F (bjt ¡ ajt)
¡ id(rjt + bjt ¡ ajt)
h
1¡ (Frjt + bjt ¡ ajt)
i
+ il
bjt¡ajtZ
¡1
"f (") d"+ id
1Z
rjt+b
j
t¡ajt
"f (") d": (18)
To compute the second term in (16) notice that from (6),
rjt1 = max
n
0; rjt ¡max
h
0;mjt + "
j
t
io
so,
rjt+1 = r
j
t ; if "
j
t · ¡mjt ;
rjt+1 = d
j
t ¡mjt ¡ "jt ; if ¡mjt · "jt · rjt ¡mjt ;
and
rjt+1 = 0; if r
j
t ¡mjt · "jt :
Then
Et
h
Vt+1(s
j
t+1;St+1)
i
=
¡mjtZ
¡1
Vt+1(r
j
t ; a
j
t+1;St+1)f (") d"
+
rjt¡mjtZ
¡mjt
Vt+1(r
j
t ¡mjt ¡ "; ajt+1;St+1)f (") d"
+
1Z
rjt¡mjt
Vt+1(0; a
j
t+1;St+1)f (") d":
Again, using (4), the …rst order condition with respect to bjt gives
it = i
lF (bjt ¡ ajt) + id
h
1¡ F (rjt + bjt ¡ ajt)
i
¡
rjt+b
j
t¡ajtZ
bjt¡ajt
@Vt+1(r
j
t+1; a
j
t+1;St+1)
@rjt+1
f (") d" (19)
which generates the supply of funds on any day t · T ¡ 1. The intuition is the
same as before. When deciding the supply of funds, banks equate the marginal
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revenue of lending funds (as represented by the market rate) to the expected
marginal cost. The expected marginal cost is an average of the marginal costs
after the shock hits the bank. If the bank is not locked-in (rjt > 0), there are
three possibilities, depending on the size of the shock:
² For shocks satisfying ²jt < ¡mjt , the bank will have an overdraft at the end
of the day and will have to borrow from the central bank. In that case,
the marginal cost of funds would be il. This happens with probability
F (bjt ¡ ajt).
² On the opposite side, for shocks satisfying ²jt > rjt ¡mjt , the bank accumu-
lates so much reserves that it will be locked-in. In such cases, the marginal
cost of funds will be id. This happens with probability 1¡F (rjt +bjt¡ajt).
² Finally, for intermediate cases, ¡mjT¡1 < ²T¡1 < rjT¡1 ¡mjT¡1, the bank
accumulates reserves but still have a reserve de…ciency that needs to be
resolved in the future. In this case, the marginal cost of funds should be
equal to the marginal value of funds in the following day.
With expression (19) it is not possible to compute the equilibrium interest rate
for t · T ¡ 1 explicitly. The following section will approximate this rate in a
numerical example.
The partial derivative of the value function with respect to ajT¡1 is
@Vt
@ajt
= it +
1Z
¡1
@Vt+1
@ajt+1
f (") d" =
TX
¿=t
i¿ : (20)
What is the value that a bank associates with having an additional unit of
reserves at day t? This bank can lend that unit on day t and on future days.
This decision will not a¤ect its state on any day and will increase its pro…ts byPT
¿=t i¿ . In other words, having an additional unit of reserves on day t, means,
on average, a permanent addition for the balance of the bank and, therefore,
its value is the accumulated expected revenue of that unit for the rest of the
reserve maintenance period. For a single bank, this value is represented by the
sum of the market rates up to day T .
The partial derivative of the value function with respect to rjt is
@Vt
@rjt
= ¡id
h
1¡ F (rjt ¡mjt)
i
+
rjt¡mjtZ
¡1
@Vt+1
@rjt+1
f (") d": (21)
What is the value that a bank associates with having a unit of de…ciency less on
day t? This value depends on what its situation is at the end of t. If the bank
ends up the day locked-in, starting the day with a smaller de…ciency has a low
value, the deposit rate. This is the …rst term of the right hand side of (21). In
all other cases, a smaller de…ciency decreases rjt permanently and the value of
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this event is determined by @V jt+1=@r
j
t+1. This is the second term. Notice the
mechanism here is di¤erent than the mechanism of increasing initial reserves,
ajt . The value we assign to have a smaller de…ciency depends on the probability
that this reduction is kept over time which is determined by the probability
of not being locked-in. On the contrary, having an additional unit of reserves
implies a permanent addition independently of the shocks that may happen in
the future.
3.3.3 The open market operation at t = 1
The initial level of reserves is injected through an open market operation that
takes place at the beginning of day 1, before the market opens. It is assumed that
the central bank supplies reserves inelastically at the interest rate io through
loans with a maturity of T days. All banks participating in the open market
operation are identical. They have no funds and have to accumulate R reserves
through the next T days. The problem for bank j is to choose the reserves bor-
rowed from the central bank, aj1, to maximize expected pro…ts for the maturity
of the loan, T days. These expected pro…ts are, therefore,
¼jomo = V1(R; a
j
1;S1)¡ Tioaj1:
The …rst order condition that determines the initial level of reserves for these
banks is
io =
1
T
@V1
@aj1
=
1
T
TX
¿=1
i¿ : (22)
Since all banks start from the same situation, they will demand the same amount
from the OMO so we can write aj1 = A1. Notice, the bank considers itself a
small player in the economy so that its bid in the open market operation does
not a¤ect equilibrium rates. The intuition from expression (22) should be clear.
Banks bid for o¢cial reserves up to the point where the daily marginal cost of
those reserves (the OMO rate) equals the expected average marginal value of
those reserves throughout the maturity of the loan given by the average of the
sequence of market rates.
Expression (22) also helps understand why the OMO rate is an attractor of
the market rate. When the OMO rate is large relative to the lending and deposit
rate, banks understand that reserves are expensive and bid a smaller amount.
With fewer reserves the probability of having an overdraft increases and so does
the market rate on average over the period. Notice also, this condition imposes
a restriction on the average of the market rates over the maintenance period
but does not say anything about the actual path. In fact, we will show that this
path is increasing and this feature is linked to the evolution of the probabilities
of going to the lending and deposit facility together with the characteristic of
being locked-in as an absorbing state.
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3.4 The Martingale Hypothesis
Because of the continuum of banks with measure one, the law of large numbers
apply in this economy. This means that there is no aggregate risk so the partic-
ular form of the martingale hypothesis is whether equilibrium rates are constant
over the maintenance period or not. So, is it true that it = it+1 in this model?
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the answer to this question depends
on, whether at constant rates banks keep the aggregate demand of funds equal
to the constant aggregate supply for the whole maintenance period. Expression
(19) expresses the demand (negative supply) for funds on any day t < T . We
see that the evolution of demand (¡bjt) over time depends upon the evolution
of the measures associated with the three sets for which bank j
1. has an overdraft,
©1t ´
n
² : ²t < b
j
t ¡ ajt
o
; (23)
2. accumulates reserves,
©2t ´
n
² : bjt ¡ ajt < ²t < rjt + bjt ¡ ajt
o
; (24)
or
3. is locked-in,
©3t ´
n
² : ²t > r
j
t + b
j
t ¡ ajt
o
: (25)
Intuitively, with a constant demand for funds, the bank expects the proba-
bility of being overdraft to be roughly constant throughout the reserve mainte-
nance period. On the other hand, the probability of going to the deposit facility
should be increasing over time since once we have excess reserves on one day we
are locked-in for the rest of the maintenance period. Banks anticipate this and
postpone demand. With a constant supply of reserves this should put upward
pressure on the interest rate towards settlement day.
It is not possible to give a general assessment about the size and sign of these
deviations from the martingale behavior. To get an answer to this question, we
present a numerical example where the behavior of the interest rate can be
computed.
3.4.1 A Numerical Example
In this section, we calibrate the model to replicate the daily market for funds in
Germany before and after the beginning of the EMU. The di¤erences between
these two markets are captured by two sets of values for the o¢cial rates. The
rest of parameters are common across the two economies to show that changes in
the o¢cial rates can be responsible for the stylized facts documented in section
2.
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The common parameters are T , R, and ¾. The length of the maintenance
period, T , takes value of 4 days. As mentioned before, one way to think about
this length is that we are …nding the interest rates for the days after the last
open market operation of the period. For computational reasons, 4 was the
largest we could compute. The reserve requirement is R = 400 which means
that banks have to accumulate an average of 100 units per day. This value
is chosen so that we can interpret the numbers below as percentages of daily
requirements. The shock is assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero
mean and standard deviation ¾ = 100. This number is calibrated with the
aggregate transactions observed in the market which represents approximately
50 percent of the average daily requirement. The distribution of the shock is
approximated with a grid at 10 unit intervals large enough to capture three
times its standard deviation.
The o¢cial rates are calibrated as follows. Since both the Bundesbank and
the ECB had a lending facility, we keep the lending rate constant and set it
to il = 5 percent. Then, we leave id to take two values in order to di¤erenti-
ate between Germany before and after the EMU. The value id = 0 represents
Germany before Stage Three of the EMU. Remember Germany did not have
a deposit facility then. Germany after January 1999 is represented by id = 3.
This value for the deposit rate produces a band with a width of 200 basis point
as we observe in the Euro area.
With respect to the OMO rate, we proceed as follows. Instead of imposing
a rate, we solve the model for di¤erent values of A1 in the set A1 2 [70, 130]
and compute the average marginal value of funds, that is, the right-hand side of
expression (22). This gives us the demand schedule of the market for funds in
the open market operation. Table 5 presents, for each value of A1, the sequence
of equilibrium rates (columns i1 to i4) as well as the average marginal value of
funds as of day one (column AMV F ) for the case of Germany before the EMU,
that is, without a deposit facility (id = 0).
Table 5
Equilibrium rates for id = 0
A1 AMVF i1 i2 i3 i4
70 3.96 3.87 3.92 3.98 4.07
80 3.45 3.37 3.41 3.47 3.54
90 2.83 2.76 2.80 2.84 2.90
100 2.18 2.11 2.15 2.19 2.26
110 1.67 1.60 1.64 1.68 1.76
120 1.25 1.19 1.22 1.26 1.35
130 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.93 1.02
In order to know how much banks will be willing to bid at a particular OMO
rate, we just have to look at the value of A1 with an average marginal value
of funds equal to the rate of the open market operation. The OMO rate in
Germany before 1999 was between 3 and 3.5 percent. This means that banks
should bid around 80 units of reserves in the open market operation which will
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have the system short of the daily requirement by 20 units. Banks do this
because, given that reserves are expensive relative to the deposit and lending
rates, they decide to play the game of obtaining them in the future through
the shocks. We observe that interest rates increase in these four days by 17
basis points. To us this is a sizable amount given that we have an economy
without aggregate risk, where banks are heterogeneous on three days only and
with perfect markets. In fact, a peak of similar magnitude in the path for the
overnight rate is a feature shared by all lines in the table.
After the EMU, the Eurosystem created a band for the overnight rate of 200
basis points with the OMO rate set at the middle point. We reproduce this fact
in the example by setting the deposit rate at 3 percent. Table 6 collects the
results for this case. Still we …nd the peaks as before but their magnitude is
much smaller. For example, for the equilibrium sequence closest to the OMO
rate of 4 percent, the overnight rate increases by 5 basis points. This means
that before the EMU the increments in the overnight rate were more than three
times larger than the corresponding increments after 1999.
Table 6
Equilibrium rates for id = 3
A1 AMVF i1 i2 i3 i4
70 4.59 4.56 4.57 4.60 4.64
80 4.38 4.35 4.37 4.39 4.42
90 4.13 4.11 4.12 4.14 4.16
100 3.86 3.84 3.85 3.87 3.90
110 3.67 3.65 3.66 3.68 3.71
120 3.49 3.47 3.48 3.49 3.53
130 3.37 3.35 3.36 3.37 3.41
3.4.2 Intuition and Policy Implications
To understand the intuition behind Tables 5 and 6 we should remind the reader
that the expressions determining the funds rate have been derived from maxi-
mization conditions. Therefore, there is an implicit arbitrage argument in those
expressions. At the equilibrium prices, banks should not have any incentive to
move reserves between di¤erent days of the reserve maintenance period in order
to increase the objective function.
When banks decide their demand for reserves within the maintenance period
they have to weight the di¤erent costs and bene…ts of increasing their deposits
at the central bank. The cost of not having enough reserves is the lending rate
which is above the daily rate. The cost of having too many reserves is the
possibility of being locked-in earlier in the period and to receive the deposit
rate which is smaller than the overnight rate. Clearly, whether the bank will be
indi¤erent to substitute reserves will depend not only on the average rate but
also on the likelihood of these two outcomes in the future which are measured
by the probabilities of having a shock belonging to the sets ©1t and ©3t in (23)
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and (25), respectively. De…ne these probabilities as
pkt = prob f²t 2 ©ktg ; k = 1; 2; 3:
The number p1t corresponds to the probability of ending day t with an overdraft
while the number p3t corresponds to ending day t being locked-in. Since the
shock is i.i.d. with zero mean, each bank expects its level of reserves, ajt , to be
constant. For the same reason, the bank expects the reserve de…ciency, rjt , to
be decreasing over time. This implies that, as we get closer to T , p3t should be
increasing while p1t should be constant except for the last day.
Tables 7 and 8 show the probabilities of ending the day with an overdraft or
with excess reserves for values of the deposit rate equal to 0 and 3, respectively.
Table 7
Probability of ending the day with overdraft and locked-in for id = 0
A1 p11 p12 p13 p14 p31 p32 p33 p34
70 0.2266 0.2403 0.2584 0.7642 0.0000 0.0161 0.0800 0.2374
80 0.1977 0.2117 0.2282 0.6707 0.0000 0.0239 0.1184 0.3293
90 0.1710 0.1836 0.2016 0.5639 0.0000 0.0368 0.1709 0.4361
100 0.1468 0.1568 0.1743 0.4520 0.0016 0.0555 0.2405 0.5480
110 0.1251 0.1333 0.1487 0.3520 0.0022 0.0787 0.3190 0.6480
120 0.1056 0.1120 0.1263 0.2700 0.0030 0.1083 0.4021 0.7300
130 0.0885 0.0944 0.1043 0.2040 0.0040 0.1432 0.4851 0.7960
Table 8
Probability of ending the day with overdraft and locked-in for id = 3
A1 p11 p12 p13 p14 p31 p32 p33 p34
70 0.2266 0.2374 0.2595 0.7681 0.0000 0.0162 0.0807 0.2319
80 0.1977 0.2125 0.2285 0.6723 0.0000 0.0238 0.1177 0.3277
90 0.1710 0.1836 0.2029 0.5640 0.0000 0.0368 0.1696 0.4360
100 0.1468 0.1541 0.1748 0.4500 0.0016 0.0563 0.2427 0.5500
110 0.1251 0.1333 0.1496 0.3550 0.0022 0.0787 0.3175 0.6450
120 0.1056 0.1119 0.1229 0.2650 0.0030 0.1088 0.4072 0.7350
130 0.0885 0.0947 0.1030 0.2050 0.0040 0.1431 0.4877 0.7950
Several conclusions can be drawn from these tables. First, the probabilities are
very similar for id = 0 and id = 3. This means that banks decide on their
borrowing and lending depending on the path of interest rates relative to the
band determined by the lending and deposit rate. Second, the larger the initial
level of reserves, the larger the probability of being locked-in and the smaller
the probability of being overdraft. Finally, as we argued above, for any level of
A1, the probability of going to the lending facility is fairly constant throughout
the reserve maintenance period, while the probability of going to the deposit
facility is steadily increasing over time.
There are two elements that may in‡uence the path of the overnight rate:
the width of the band between the lending and deposit rate and the relative
26
position of the OMO rate within the band. Remember banks care about the
costs of going to the lending and deposit facility but being locked-in has an extra
cost in the sense that it is an absorbing state. As we said before, this perception
would imply a tendency of the banks to postpone their holding of reserves to
avoid that risk. Those banks following that strategy, will have to pay a higher
interest rate when they want to hold reserves, at the end of the maintenance
period. Therefore, with an increasing path for the overnight rate, a bank is
indi¤erent between holding reserves at the beginning (when they pay a lower
rate but increase the risk of being locked-in) or at the end of the maintenance
period (when they pay a higher rate but avoid the risk of being locked-in).
Given a band for the interest rate we can understand why changing the
OMO rate a¤ects the average of the overnight rate for the maintenance period
but it does not a¤ect the di¤erence between the rates on the last and …rst days.
By increasing the OMO rate, the central bank increases the marginal cost of
funds for the period. Commercial banks react to this situation by decreasing
their demand for o¢cial reserves and letting the system go short of the require-
ment. This increases the average market rate because it makes more likely the
possibility of going to the lending facility throughout the whole maintenance pe-
riod. However, although the probability of being locked-in has decreased, the
di¤erence between the market rate and the deposit rate has increased. Thus,
even though having excess reserves is less likely, it is more expensive in terms
of opportunity cost which compensates the reduction in its probability. In the
opposite case, when the OMO rate is reduced, the cost decreases but the event
of being locked-in is more likely.
On the other hand, the width of the band a¤ects the observed path of the
overnight rate. By increasing the deposit rate towards the lending rate, the
central bank is reducing the relative cost of being locked-in and the inclina-
tion of banks to postpone demand to avoid that risk. This example shows that
the spread between the lending and the deposit rate plays a crucial role in the
determination of the statistical properties of the overnight rate. This is impor-
tant because all monetary systems have implicitly or explicitly a band for the
overnight rate. For systems without standing facilities this band is de…ned be-
tween the discount rate (plus all non-pecuniary costs associated with borrowing
from the central bank) and zero. Interestingly, the pattern of increasing rates
has been documented for other economies without standing facilities, specially
the US.17 So, this model can shed light in the explanation of those observations
as well.
We believe these results have important implications for policy. First, they
show that central banks could achieve a stable pro…le for the overnight rate in
two ways. On the one hand, they could actively try to reduce the volatility of
that rate by intervening in the market at the end of each maintenance period.
Alternatively, they could passively obtain that goal by setting a corridor for
the daily rate with the two standing facilities. The resources needed to follow
the …rst option seem much larger than what is required to design the second
17See, among otheres, Bartolini et al. [2] and Hamilton [10].
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one. This discussion suggests that the introduction of two standing facilities
appears as a preferable system to stabilize the overnight rate. Second, the
important measure of how expansionary or contractionary monetary policy is
in one country, in terms of the associated demand for reserves for a given OMO
rate, does not only depend on the level of the OMO rate but also on that level
relative to the band for the overnight rate. So, a central bank that reduces the
OMO rate together with the limits of the band does not necessarily mean that
is following a more expansionary policy.
Once we know how the overnight rate evolves after the last OMO, we can
also argue how it should behave on any other day of the maintenance period.
The principle is still the same. The daily rate is determined by demands and
supplies that are decided on the basis of the expected marginal cost of funds at
the end of each day. At the beginning of the reserve maintenance period, the
probability of being locked-in is basically zero. The probability of having an
overdraft is not zero but small. So, in determining the marginal cost of funds,
the only important term is
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If banks do not expect changes in the conduct of monetary policy in the future
associated with changes in the OMO rate, the overnight rate should be close to
a martingale.
4 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence about the time series properties of the overnight
rate in Germany. It shows that the process governing this rate has become
closer to a martingale after the start of the EMU. Before January 1999, this
series exhibited signi…cant peaks associated with end of reserve maintenance
periods.
We develop a model of reserve management by banks to explain the changes
in the mean process of the daily rate. An important theoretical implication
is that, with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement, banks do not
see funds on di¤erent days of the same reserve maintenance period as perfect
substitutes even if they expect rates to be constant in the future. In fact, this
type of behavior implies a process for the interest rate that tends to be higher
as we approach settlement day. The paper also shows that these deviations
from the martingale hypothesis are reduced as the spread between the central
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bank’s lending and deposit rates decreases. We obtain these results neither by
invoking market frictions, nor by imposing noncompetitive behavior. It is just
a consequence of paying particular attention in modeling the opportunity costs
faced by risk neutral banks and how these costs change as we move along the
reserve maintenance period.
Patterns for the mean process of the overnight rate characterized by increases
at the end of the reserve maintenance period have been documented before.
The explanations for such patterns were exclusively based on market frictions
or risk averse behavior. Our point is that we do not need those ingredients to
understand deviations from the martingale hypothesis. The way we see market
frictions or risk aversion is as devices that amplify a mechanism that is in place
even in economies with risk neutral agents and no impediments to trade.
With respect to our particular application, our explanation seems more plau-
sible than competing ones given that we are dealing with the same economy
where attitudes toward risk or market institutions have changed little. Summa-
rizing, it seems that the institutional framework of the new system has been an
important element in producing a smoother patter for the market rate in Ger-
many. In particular, we can trace the origin of this change to the introduction
of a deposit facility by the ECB that it was not in place before the EMU.
A Solution of the Model
In the solution of the model we use the following results. De…ne the following
functions:
H1 (x) =
xZ
¡1
"f (") d";
H2 (x) =
1Z
x
"f (") d";
H3 (x) =
xZ
¡1
v (x; ") f (") d";
and
H4 (x) =
1Z
x
v (x; ") f (") d":
Then,
dH1 (x)
dx
= xf (x) ;
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Rearranging this expression yields (10)
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The solid line represents the difference between the overnight rate and the target rate at a daily frequency. The 
dotted lines are ends of maintenance periods. The sample covers from September 1996 to December 1998 for 
Germany and from January 1999 to January 2003 for the Euro-Area.
FIGURE 1
Spread: overnight rate minus official rate
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In both figures, the horizontal axis represents the number of days until the next reserve maintenance period. 
The solid line is the average spread for each day of the maintenance period. The dotted lines form a 
two-standard deviation band.
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